This work is inspired by a 2013 paper from Arne Traulsen's lab at the Max Plank Institute for Evolutionary Biology [10] . They studied the small mutation limit of evolutionary games. It has been shown that for 2×2 games the ranking of the strategies does not change as strength of selection is increased [11] . The point of the 2013 paper is that when there are three or more strategies the ordering can change as selection is increased. Wu et al [10] did numerical computations for fixed N . Here, we will instead let the strength of selection β = c/N and let N → ∞ to obtain formulas for the invadability probabilities φ ij that determine the rankings. These formulas, which are integrals on [0, 1], are intractable calculus problems but can be easily evaluated numerically. Here, we concentrate on simple formulas for the ranking order when c is small or c is large. * This work was done while she was an exchange student visiting Duke in the Fall semester of 2017 † Partially supported by an NSF grant from the math biology program.
Introduction
Let a ij be the payoff to a player who uses strategy i against an opponent who uses strategy j. Let x j be the frequency of strategy j and define the fitness of strategy i to be
the payoff when a player with strategy i plays against a randomly chosen individual. We will study how the frequencies behave under imitation dynamics. In this evolution a player a chosen at random from the population compares her payoff to an opponent b chosen at random and changes her opinion with probability g(β(ψ i(b) − ψ i(a) )) where β indicates the strength of selection and g : R → (0, 1) is a nondecreasing function, such as the Fermi function g(x) = 1/(1+e −x ). Thinking of biological competition and following in the footsteps of [4] , Wu et al [10] consider the situation in which the mutation rate is small enough so that at most times there is only one strategy i in the population. In this case a mutation that introduces one j into a population that is all i will go to fixation with probability φ ij that can be computed by analyzing a birth and death chain. We suppose that the model rate from i to j µ ij ≡ µ. Having computed φ ij one can then analyze the Markov chain with jumps from i to j at rate µφ ij to find the equilibrium frequencies π i (β) of the strategies.
The relative sizes of the π i (β) give an ordering of the strategies. It has been shown that for 2×2 games the ranking of the strategies does not change as strength of fitness is increased [11] . The point of [10] is that when there are three or more strategies the ordering can change as β is increased, which the authors tout as a weakness of the "weak selection" viewpoint. In the supplementary materials of [10] they give a complicated argument for the existence of a game in which the strategy ordering can change. In the body of the paper they report on simulations of games with randomly chosen entries that show ranking changes occur in approximately 45% of games.
Here, we will let the strength of selection β = c/N and let N → ∞ to obtain formulas for the invadability probabilities φ ij that determine the rankings. The integrals that give these probabilities, see (6) , are difficult to evaluate in general, but they do allow us to compute the ranking order when c is small or c is large. The dichotomy between small c and large c is similar to that of wN and N w limits introduced by Jeoeng et al [5] and recently studied by Sample and Allen [8] . In the first case one lets the strength of selection w → 0 the number of individuals N → ∞. In the second the order of the limits is reversed. In our case w = c?N so w → 0 and N → ∞ simultaneously.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we develop formulas for the φ ij . In Section 3 we compute the stationary distribution for the Markov chain that gives the transition between dominant strategies. In Sections 4 and 5 we give our results for small c and large c respectively. Section 6 prepares for the study of examples by developing formulas for the three different classes of 2×2 games. In Sections 7 -11 we apply our results we have obtained to five concrete examples. We summarize our results and discuss open problems in Section 12.
Formulas for φ ij
In what follows we will use a theorem-proof style of exposition to highlight the main results and to allow the reader to skip the details of the derivations. For simplicity, we will ignore the fact that you can't play the game against yourself to write the payoffs from playing strategies i and j when k individuals are using strategy j as
Note that if we add c k to the entries in the kth column, the payoff difference is not changed so we can without loss of generality suppose that the diagonal entries are 0. If we do this then the payoff difference simplifies to
We assume that each individual updates her strategy at rate 1, so the jump rates
Our first step is to compute the fixation probability. The next result is the same as (4) in the supplementary materials of [10] . In the context of evolutionary games this formula was derived by Taylor et al [9] . However it was first discovered by Karlin and McGregor in the late 1950s [6] .
Proof. The first step is to define a function that has h(0) = 0, h(1) = 1, and
The last equation implies that if we let X t be the number of the invading type at time t, then E x h(X t ) remains constant so
To find h we note that (3) implies
Iterating and using h(1) − h(0) = 1 it follows that
and hence
so using (4) gives (2).
Theorem 2. If we let γ = g (0)/g(0) and suppose N β → c then φ ij ≈ 1/N I ij where
Note that the answer only depends on 2γc so we can without loss of generality suppose γ = 1/2.
Proof. To begin to understand (2) we look at the ratio
Note that γ is the only aspect of g relevant to the value of φ ij . For the Fermi function
and it follows that if βN → c
which proves the desired result.
Equilibrium distribution
If µ is the mutation rate from i to j = i the transition rate matrix is
To find the stationary distribution, we need to solve
The solution is straightforward, but somewhat tedious, so we just give the answer:
where D is the sum of the three numerators. The three formulas can be collapsed into one by writing
where j = i − 1 and k = i + 1 and the arithmetic is done in Z mod 3 = {1, 2, 3}.
Small c
The main result of this section is (11) which allows us to compute the strategy ranking for small c. The reader who gets bored with the details can skip to that point. If c is small
If we (i) cancel the 1/N 's and then drop terms of order c 2 then the numerators n i of the π i are
Note that in are missing appear twice n 1 1,2 and 1,3 3,1 and 2,1 n 2 2,1 and 2,3 3,2 and 1,2 n 3 3,2 and 3,1 1,3 and 2,3
If we let Γ = 3 + c[ψ 12 + ψ 13 + ψ 21 + ψ 23 + ψ 31 + ψ 32 ] then
To check the arithmetic, note that the terms that are missing must be positive inside the square brackets while those that appear twice must be negative.
The relative sizes of the n i gives the strategy ordering for small c. To further simplify we note that ψ ij − ψ ji = (a ji − a ij )/2. so if we let d ij = (a ji − a ij )/2 (10) and note that d ji = −d ij then we have
We have used d 31 instead of d 13 so we have the general formula
where the arithmetic is done modulo 3. It is not easy to write a formula for the ranking in terms of the entries of the game matrix. However, as the reader will see when we consider examples, it is easy to compute the rankings for a given example.
Large c
The main result of the section is given in the table at the end. The reader who gets bored by the calculus can skip to that point. We are interested in estimating the size of
when c is large. This will be determined by the largest value of the integrand on [0, 1]. To simplify notation we let α = −a ji , let β = a ji + a ij , and Artie
We begin with the case β = 0. If α < 0
If α > 0 we change variables x = 1 − y
Suppose now β = 0. Taking the derivative h (x) = α + βx so h (x) = 0 at x * = −α/β. There are several cases for the location of the maximum of the integrand
If the maximum occurs at 0 then h (0) = α < 0 and
If the maximum occurs at 1 then we change variables x = 1 − y to get The second and fifth terms in the second line combine to produce the one out front in the third line. The first and fourth cancel. Recalling that normal(0,σ 2 ) density is
and taking σ 2 = 1/(−cβ) we see that
Combining the table that gives the location of the maxima with the last five calculations.
Three types of edges
To prepare for using the large c formulas on examples, we note that I ij and I ji only depend on the payoffs in the 2 × 2 subgame with strategies i and j. In this game only three things case condition can happen i j, there is a stable mixed strategy equilibrium, or there is an unstable mixed strategy equilibrium Case 1. i dominates j. Since we have 0's on the diagonal a ij > 0 and a ij < 0. We can have β = a ij + a ji positive or negative. 
Example 1. Rock-paper-scissors
The game matrix is
Writing i j for strategy i dominates strategy j in the (i, j) subgame this example has 1 2 3 1, which is the same as strategy relationship in the rock-paper-scissors game. Noting that n 3 > n 2 > n 1 , we see that for small c, 3 > 2 1.
Large c. To use the formulas derived in Sections 5 and 6 we compute α = −a ji , β = (a ji + a ij ), and x * = −α/β. If we recall that (6) implies φ ij ≈ 1/N I ij , i.e., a large I ij means that it is very difficult for j to invade i, then we see that the answers consistent with the ordering 1 2 3 1: φ 12 , φ 23 , and φ 31 are exponentially small. When we use (9) the N 's cancel out. Marking the small terms with *'s Since the small c rankings are based on a linear function of the matrix entries and the large c formulas are quadratic, it is not surprising that they can be different. The asymptotic formula in (17) implies D ∼ [a 23 a 12 + a 31 a 23 + a 12 a 31 ]c 2
In the concrete example this implies π 1 → 1/7, π 2 → 4/7, π 3 → 2/7, which agrees with Figure 2 .
Example 2. One stable edge fixed point
The game matrix is 1 2
The 1,2 subgame has a mixed strategy equilibrium (1/3, 2/3) in which each strategy has fitness 4/3. When played against this equilibrium 3 has fitness 2/3 − 4/3 = −2/3 so it cannot invade. In the other 2 × 2 subgames 3 1 and 2 3. 
Noting that n 2 > n 3 > n 1 , we see that for small c, 2 3 1.
Large c. Again we need to compute α = −a ji , β = (a ji + a ij ), and x * = −α/β. Again (6) implies φ ij = 1/N I ij , so φ 21 , φ 31 and φ 23 are exponentially small. Consulting the formula for the stationary distribution and marking the small terms with *
From this we see that Dπ 2 ≈ 3c · 4c + 0 + 2c · 3c = 18c 2 while π 1 and π 3 are exponentially small. To compare π 1 and π 3 we need to compute the exact order of the three terms. . Thus for large c we have 2 1 3. π 1 and π 3 are both exponentially small so π 2 → 1.
Example 3. Two stable edge fixed points
The game matrix is 1 2 3 1 0 1 −1 2 2 0 3 3 2 1 0 Frequencies are plotted on a log scale so that we can see π 1 and π 3 have the same exponential decay rate but π 1 has a larger constant.
The 1,2 subgame has a mixed strategy equilibrium (1/3, 2/3) in which each strategy has fitness 2/3. When played against this equilibrium, strategy 3 has fitness 2/3 + 2/3 = 4/3 so it can invade. The 2,3 subgame has a mixed strategy equilibrium (3/4, 1/4) in which each strategy has fitness 3/4. When played against this equilibrium, strategy 1 has fitness 3/4 − 1/4 = 1/2 so 1 cannot invade. In the 1,3 subgame 3 1
Small c. Using (10) Noting that n 2 > n 3 > n 1 , we see that for small c, 2 3 1.
Large c. Again, α = −a ji , β = (a ji + a ij ), and x * = −α/β. Using (6), φ ij = 1/N I ij we see that again φ 21 , φ 31 and φ 23 are exponentially small, so marking the small terms with *'s, we have the same pattern as in the previous example.
From this we see that
while π 1 and π 3 are exponentially small. To compare π 1 and π 3 we need to compute the exact order of the three terms.
Dπ 1 1.5 0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 Dπ 3 1 0 0.5 0 0 1 so we have Dπ 1 ≈ 6c 2 exp(−c/2) and Dπ 3 ≈ 4c 2 exp(−c/2). Thus for large c we have 2 1 > 3. π 1 and π 3 are both exponentially small so π 2 → 1. This the ranking remains the same for large c: 3 2 1.
Example 5. Two ranking changes
In the previous four examples there has been a most one ranking change. We now give an example with two changes. The game matrix is and it follows that
Noting that n 2 > n 1 > n 3 , we see that for small c, 2 1 3.
Large c. Again, α = −a ji , β = (a ji + a ij ), and x * = −α/β. Using (9), φ ij = 1/N I ij we see that φ 21 , φ 31 , and φ 32 are exponentially small, so marking the small terms with *'s, we have the same pattern as in the previous example.
Dπ 1 = φ * 31 φ 21 + φ 32 φ 21 + φ * 23 φ * 31 ≈ 2.4(3.2)c 2 Dπ 2 = φ * 12 φ 32 + φ 13 φ 32 + φ * 31 φ * 12 ≈ 5.7(2.4)c 2 Dπ 3 = φ * 23 φ 13 + φ 21 φ 13 + φ * 12 φ * 23 ≈ 3.2(5.7)c 2 so for large c we have 3 2 1. Comparing this with the small c ranking of 2 1 3 we can see that there must be two ranking changes to bring strategy 3 from last to first.
Discussion
In this paper we have developed methods for computing strategy rankings in evolutionary games when mutation rates are small, the strength of selection is c/N , and the population size N → ∞. For any c the limiting rankings can be computed by numerically evaluating an integrals on [0, 1]. We have simple explicit results when c is small or c is large that allow us to infer that ranking changes have occurred. Simulations of games with 3 ≤ n ≤ 9 strategies show (see Figure 4 in [10] ) that a positive fraction of n strategy games have ≥ n − 1 ranking changes, while Figure 3 gives a 3 strategy example that has 4 strategy changes. One can, of course, investigate ranking changes in games numerically, but it would be nice to develop mathematical methods to determine the number of changes for intermediate c.
The formulas we have for rankings for small c and large c are simple. They allow us to obtain insights into conditions under which strategy rankings change in rock-paper-scissors examples. However, at this point it does not seem possible to give meaningful results identifying the class of games that have no strategy changes. Perhaps there is no simple answer, but it would be interesting if one could be found.
